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STATE POWER TO REGULATE INTERSTATE COMMERCE:
BARNWELL RE-ADOPTED?
The commerce clause is an affirmative grant of power to Congress
"to regulate commerce . . . among the several states."' Because of the
affirmative cast of the commerce clause, courts have held that there exists
a negative implication that state action regulating interstate commerce is
precluded as an interference with power reserved to the federal government 2 Yet, it is obvious that state regulations differ both in significance
of the state interest advanced and in impact on the federal interest of
assuring an unimpeded flow of commerce among the several states. Thus,
the courts have been reluctant to exclude completely state regulations, but
have tended to strive for a compromise between the state and national
interests.' The standard to be followed in determining the validity of
state regulations and the role of the courts in that determination,4 have
1. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.

2. The Supreme Court of Justice Marshall favored the view that, by implication.
the commerce clause prohibited all state regulation of interstate commerce whether
Congress had passed legislation or remained silent. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827);
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). But see Willson v. Black Bird Creek
Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (4 Pet.) 245 (1829). In contrast, Justice Taney argued that the
commerce clause, as a grant of power to Congress, did not prohibit state action; state

legislation affecting interstate commerce was permissible so long as it did not invade an
area of existing federal legislation. However, this theory never won the support of a
majority of the Court. See the six concurring opinions in License Cases, 46 U.S. (5
How.) 504 (1847). Also see The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849) (Taney,
C.J., dissenting); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842); Groves v.
Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449 (1841) (Taney, C.J., concurring) ; City of N.Y. v.
Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837).
3. The standards applied by courts succeeding the Taney era recognized valid state
and national spheres of regulation. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.)
299 (1851), compromised the Marshall and Taney views in holding that the exclusive
control of Congress over interstate commerce was limited to subjects of "national"
consequence needing a "uniform" system of regulation; absent federal legislation, the
states were free to regulate matters of "local" nature. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100
(1890), further developed the Cooley standard in holding that nothing inherent in the
commerce clause prevented state action which regulated interstate commerce. Rather, the
will of Congress, express or implied, might prohibit state regulation. Thus, the Court
replaced Cooley's rigid position with a flexible presumption against the validity of state
legislation in areas of national consequence. During the next half century the Court began
to speak in terms of "indirect" and "direct" burdens on interstate commerce, allowing
only the former, rather than in terms of the need for "national" or "local" regulation.
Yet the Court's basic approach of specifying an area of interstate commerce from
which state regulations were precluded, regardless of benefit to local interests, remained
the same. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511 (1935) ; Buck v. Kuykendall, 267
U.S. 307 (1925): Smith v. St. Louis & S.W.R.R., 181 U.S. 248 (1901); Plumley v.
Massachusetts, 155 U.S. 461 (1894).
4. For practical purposes, the polar views of Marshall and Taney precluded the
question of state power to affect interstate commerce from judicial determination. The
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been long-standing points of contention before the Supreme Court. The
recent decision in Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v.
Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R.' may indicate a significant change in the Court's
approach to the problem.6
Barnwell and Southern Pacific
7 writSouth Carolina Highway Department v. Barnwell Brothers,
ten by Justice Stone, represented a new approach to a standard for determining the validity of state regulations affecting interstate commerce.'
The case concerned the constitutionality of a South Carolina safety
statute that set more stringent weight and width requirements for vehicles
than those existing in all but four other states. Justice Stone attempted
to articulate a standard which acknowledged the conflicting considerations of a law benefiting local interests while burdening interstate commerce and to set forth guidelines for evaluating such legislation. In the
unanimous' decision upholding the state law, the Court discarded the
past conclusory standards9 and held that state laws regulating interstate
commerce would be valid if the state legislature "had acted within its
province' . . . and if the means of regulation chosen are reasonably

role of the courts was limited to the minimal functions of deciding the applicability of the
commerce clause to a given fact situation and to interpreting and reconciling relevant
state and federal legislation. See cases cited supra, note 2. Under the Cooley standard
the courts assumed the role of determining on a case-by-case basis whether the need for
uniformity of regulation existed, but without establishing any guidelines for making the
determination. The lack of guidelines made the Cooley standard conclusory rather than
a meaningful guide to legitimate state action, and the further development in Leisy
merely gave the courts the additional task of anticipating the will of Congress. The later
adoption of the "indirect-direct" burden terminology failed to change the conclusory
nature of the standard as applied.
5. 393 U.S. 129 (1968).
6. The question of federal power under the commerce clause is beyond the scope of
this comment except as incidental to it. For a full discussion of federal power under
the commerce clause see Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy,
1933-1945 (pts. 1 and 2), 59 HARv. L. REv. 645, 883 (1946).
7. 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
8. In a vigorous dissent in Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34 (1927), concurred in by Justices Holmes and Brandeis, Justice Stone had previously attacked the
long standing "indirect-direct" burden test as "little more than using labels to describe a
result. . . " alleging that the test was "too mechanical, too uncertain in its application,
and too remote from actualities. . . ." Rather, he argued, the validity of the state law
should be determined by a "consideration of all the facts and circumstances, such as
the nature of its regulation, its function, the character of the business involved and the
actual effect on the flow of commerce." 273 U.S. at 44.
9. See note 4 supra.
10. The "province" aspect of the Baruwell test never served as an effective
limitation on state action. Barnwell did not set any guidelines for determining what
constitutes a permissible "province" for state action regulating interstate commerce,
and the case itself is of little help since the subject of the legislation-state highwayshas traditionally been within the domain of state control. One prominent commentator
asserted that relevant guidelines could be found in the Cooley criteria for state action in
matters of local interest. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. REv.
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adapted to the end sought.""
In requiring that the state's regulation of interstate commerce be
"reasonably adapted to the ends sought," the Court was basically applying
the due process clause.' The action of a state legislature could stand if,
aided by the traditional presumption of rationality, it were reasonable in
light of the statutory purposes.' Conflicting evidence of the reasonableness or burden on interstate commerce posed by the state action merely
indicated a policy choice had been made by the legislature. 4 Thus, under
Barnwell the Court's role was limited to determining whether there was
a rational basis for the state provision, and a finding of such rationality
overcame both commerce clause "burden" and due process objections."
The vagueness of the "province" test and the laxity of the reasonableness
standard increased the power of the states to regulate commerce in areas
where Congress had not acted.
The Court seemingly rejected the Barnwell approach several years
later in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona. 6 The case focused on the
constitutionality of an Arizona safety statute regulating the length of
trains. The plaintiff claimed, and the Court agreed, that the statute,
rather than being a safety measure, created a dangerous situation, caused
delay, and increased the cost of interstate commerce. Echoing the concern
evident in Cooley v. Board of Wardens" for judicial enforcement of
uniform regulations in conveyances of a national consequence, where
Congress had remained silent, the Court declared itself the "final
arbiter"18 for the competing national and state interests. The ultimate
matter to be determined was the "nature and extent of the burden which
the state regulation ...imposes on interstate commerce" balanced with

the extent to which the state law advanced the local interest." Thus,
under Southern Pacific, a state statute could no longer satisfy the corn1, 9 (1940). However, the "province" concept was so vague that subsequent decisions
citing Barnwell seemed unable to utilize it to evaluate state action. See, e.g., McGoldrick
v. Berwind White Co., 309 U.S. 33, 45 (1940) ; Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598, 603
(1940); Philadelphia-Detroit Lines v. Simpson, 37 F. Supp. 314, 315 (S.D. W.Va.
1940); Columbia Terminals Co. v. Lambert, 30 F. Supp. 28, 31 (E.D. Mo. 1939); City
of Atlanta v. National Bituminous Coal Comm'n, 26 F. Supp. 606, 610 (D.D.C. 1938).
11. The Court found control of public highways to be traditionally a "province"
of state action and the South Carolina statute to be a rational approach to highway
safety and maintenance. 303 U.S. at 190, 192.
12. The Court in Bornwell cited due process cases in stating this requirement.
303 U.S. at 190, 191.
13. 303 U.S. at 191.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
17. See note 3 supra.

18. 325 U.S. at 769.
19. 325 U.S. at 770, 775.
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merce clause simply by being rational, but might still violate that clause
because of a consequential burden imposed on interstate commerce outweighing the benefits to local interests. As the "final arbiter" the Court
assumed the task of understanding and balancing complex and conflicting
evidence regarding the benefits to local interests of state legislation with
its concomitant burden on interstate commerce.2" The Court's role was
clearly enlarged under the Southern Pacific approach, while state power,
in contrast to that under Barnwell, was greatly decreased.
Southern Pacific represented the Court's adoption of Justice Stone's
reasoning first expressed in his dissent in Di Santo ,v. Pennsylvania.2 1
The law appeared to be settled22 after Southern Pacific, in spite of dissents
in the case from Justices Black and Douglas. The former contended that
the Court lacked the fact-finding ability to substitute its judgment on
debatable questions of reasonable action for that of a state legislature, 2
and that, in doing so, the Court was improperly acting as a "superlegislature" by making policy decisions that should be left to the elected
representatives of the people.24
The Firemen.Case
The Court's decision in Firemen raises the possibility that the arguments of Justices Black and Douglas have finally prevailed. Firemen
concerned the constitutionality of Arkansas' "full crew" laws specifying
a minimum number of employees for service on train crews.25 The
20. The Firemen decision in the district court, is a prime example of such factual
considerations undertaken by the courts. 274 F. Supp. 294 (W.D. Ark. 1967). See also,
"
e.g., cases cited infra, note 22.
21. See note 8 supra.
22. See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960);
Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 339 U.S. 420 (1958); California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725
(1948) ; Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 78 (1947) ; Panhandle Pipelines
v. Commissioner, 332 U.S. 507 (1947); Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249 (1946);
Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946); Robertson v. California, 328 U.S. 440 (1946);
Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1945).
23. It should be noted that a court, unlike a legislature which can control the factfinding process, is limited to the evidence submitted by the opposing parties for a basis
of its decision.
24. 325 U.S. at 788, 789. Other discussions of the history of state power to regulate
interstate commerce can be found in Burkhardt, Regulation of Interstate Commerce by
the States-Action by Will of Congress, 18 Miss. L.J. 230 (1947) ; Dowling, Interstate
Commerce and State Power-Revised Version, 47 CoLuir. L. REv. 547 (1947) ; Dowling,
Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. REv. 1 (1940); Givens, Commerce
Clause and the Interdependent Economy, 53 A.B.A.J. 719 (1967); Haskins, John
Marshall and the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 23 (1955) ;
Mann, The Marshall Court: Nationalization of Private Rights and Personal Liberty
From the Authority of the Commerce Clause, 38 IND. L.J. 117 (1963); Tillett, Mr.
Justice Black, Chief Justice Marshall and the Commerce Clause, 43 Nxi. L. REv. 1
(1963).
25. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 73-720 et seq., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 73-726 et seq. (1957
RepL.).
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plaintiff railroad company argued that the state law, in the light of current
technological knowledge regarding railroad safety, impermissibly burdened interstate commerce in derogation of the commerce clause and was
arbitrary and unreasonable in violation of the fourteenth amendment.26
The district court, relying upon Southern Pacific, had weighed the
conflicting evidence and found that because of new technological advances
the safety features of the Arkansas statute alleged by the state were
outweighed by the burden the statute imposed upon interstate commerce." On appeal to the Supreme Court, the district court's decision was
reversed and the Arkansas law upheld. The Court noted that the constitutionality of state "full-crew" laws had been affirmed in the past and
held that the existence of evidence to support the statutes as rational
provisions by the Arkansas legislature was sufficient to satisfy the
commerce clause as well as the due process clause.2" The Court acknowledged the existence of conflicting evidence but refused to balance the local
interest in safety with the national interest favoring unimpeded commerce
among the states as it would have done under Southern Pacific. Instead
the Court indicated that where a state statute was supported by evidence,
debatable questions of the statute's propriety were public policy decisions
to be made by elected representatives.2 9
Firemen as a Re-adoption of Barnwell
Among the several possible interpretations of the Firemen decision.
the most significant is the implication that the Supreme Court has reverted
to the Barnwell approach. Firemen may be read as indicating that state
legislation will be upheld if it is within a proper province for state action
and is rational in light of the ends sought-the position taken in Barnwell.
There are a number of similarities between the cases. Both Firemen and
Barnwell, unlike Southern Pacific, maintain that debatable questions of
the reasonableness of a rational statute are for determination by legislative
bodies. In addition, in both Firemen and Barnwell the Court seemed
concerned with limiting state action to the state's "province" but did not
elucidate the term. Traditionally, the object of the state legislation in both
cases has been within the domain of state safety regulations, and Professor
26. The plaintiff railroad claimed the Arkansas "full-crew" laws were ineffective
as a safety measure and were burdening interstate commerce by causing an increase in
operation expenses and time delays. 393 U.S. 129, 132 (1968).
27. 274 F. Supp. 294 (W.D. Ark. 1967).
28. 393 U.S. at 139.
29. "We think it plain that in striking down the full crew laws . . . the District
Court indulged in a legislative judgment wholly beyond its limited authority.
[Tlhe question of safety in the circumstances of this case-is essentially a matter of
public policy which can only be fixed by the people acting through their elected
representatives." 393 U.S. at 136, 138.
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Dowling's contention that "province" meant local interests not regulated
by Congress"0 could be applied to both cases. Thus, in addition to pointing
to the history upholding state "full-crew" laws, the Court in Firemen
noted that Congress had legislated in the area but had not overridden state
laws, thereby implying that "full-crew" legislation was to be left to the
states."
Support for the inference that the Court has returned to Barnwell
can also be found in the fact that the Firemen opinion was written by
Mr. Justice Black who had followed his vigorous dissent in Southern
Pacific with strong dissents in later opinions employing the balancing
rationale.3 3 Justice Black had continually used language like that to be
found in Firemen, arguing that where there was conflicting evidence
regarding the burdens and benefit of state action regulating interstate
commerce, the Court was improperly acting as a "super legislature" 3
in overturning a rational state statute instead of "leaving that choice to
the elected representatives of the people." 34 The same emphasis on
decreasing the role of the judiciary was clearly reflected in the Firemen
decision.
Also of significance in indicating that the Court has discarded
Southern Pacific is the possibility that the result in Firemen could have
been reached on the basis of the Southern Pacific rationale. The plaintiff
railroad company claimed that the burdens on interstate commerce caused
by the Arkansas statutes derived from loss of time and money caused by
the state laws. The Court points out that in past cases employing
Southern Pacific these burdens have been held insufficient by themselves
for striking down state laws.3 Also, the Court could have concluded that
the Southern Pacific approach of balancing the relevant facts resulted in
a decision for the state. Thus, the Court seems to have purposely used a
different approach than that taken in SouthernPacific.
Firemen as an Aberration
Whether Firemen indicates a significant shift in the Supreme Court's
analysis of state power to regulate interstate commerce is a question
30. See note 10 supra.
31. 393 U.S. at 134.
32. After dissenting in Southern Pacific, Justice Black again dissented in Nippert
v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1945). The Court next applied the Southern Pacific

rationale in Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946). In Morgan Justice Black again
voiced his dissent from Southern Pacific but acquiesced in the Court's future use of the
balancing rationale.
33. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 788 (1945) (Black, r..
dissenting).
34. Id. at 789.
35. 393 U.S. at 139, 140.
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which must await further developments in the case law. Arguably, Fire'men is simply an aberration of little long-run consequence. The Court
may have felt that loss of time and increase in operational expense were
not sufficient burdens to justify striking down the long-standing and
closely-scrutinized Arkansas statute;6 however, upholding the statute
under Southern Pacific would have necessitated overruling the district
court's discretionary determination of facts. Reluctance to do so may have
led to the Court's decision to sustain the Arkansas statute merely on
proof of the existence of evidence affording the statute a rational basis.
It is also possible that the Court meant to discourage any further litigation
over the Arkansas "full-crew" statutes in Firemen in light of the continued scrutiny by the Arkansas legislature and the fact that the Court
had previously upheld them three times. If the Court's intention was to
prevent such additional litigation, the significance of Firemen should be
limited to the factual situation presented.
Support for the contention that Firemen is an aberration can also be
found in the fact that it does not expressly overrule Southern Pacific or
follow Barnwell. Moreover, language is used in Firemen that would seem
unnecessary to a decision relying on Barnwell. Thus, the Court's discussion of time delays and money losses as burdens on interstate commerce
attributable to the Arkansas statute is irrelevant to a decision upholding
a state statute because it is supported by reasonable evidence.
Barnwell, Southern Pacific and Firemen Reconciled
A third possible interpretation of Firemen is that the case does not
depart from Southern Pacific, but, in conjunction with Barnwell, merely
explains the application of the Southern Pacific standard. Language used
in Southern Pacific could serve as a basis for reconciling the three cases.
In Southern Pacific the Court stated that the ultimate concern regarding
state power to regulate interstate commerce is "the nature and extent of
the burden. .. " and the "relative weights of the state and national
interest involved.""8 Assuming that state interests are afforded greater
weight as the matter dealt with by the state becomes of more local concern,
it appears that the Court in all three cases first determined the nature of
the state interest involved and the amount of benefit accruing to that
interest, then balanced those determinations with the statute's burden on
36. The Court, in Firemen, mentioned the continued study by the Arkansas
legislature of the "full-crew" laws. 393 U.S. at 139.
37. The Arkansas statutes in question were upheld in Missouri Pac. R. Co. v.
Norwood, 283 U.S. 249, 290 U.S. 600 (1931) ; St. Louis, I.M. & S.R. Co. v. Arkansas,
240 U.S. 518 (1916) ; Chicago R.I. & R.R. Co. v. Arkansas, 219 U.S. 453 (1911). All
of these holdings were reaffirmed in Southern Pacific. 393 U.S. at 130.
38. 325 U.S. at 770.
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interstate commerce. Arguably, if in the Court's judgment the balance
clearly favored upholding the statute, the Court would sustain the statute
merely on proof that it had a rational basis. Under'this rationale, if the
Court determined that the balance suggested a closer question, the Court
would decide between the conflicting-evidence of the statute's reasonableness.
All three cases contain language which would support this analysis.
Both Barnwell and the earlier litigation over the same Arkansas "fullcrew" laws at issue in Firemen were relied on by the plaintiff in Southern
Pacific. In discussing the plaintiff's contentions, the Court reaffirmed
that the Arkansas statutes imposed a "minimal burden" on interstate
commerce." Furthermore, Firemen reasserts Southern Pacific's recognition of the insufficiency of time delays and increased cost to overturn
statutes such as "full-crew" laws which serve a recognized local interest.4"
Thus, given a valid state interest and a "minimal burden" like that in
Firemen, the Court ruled that proof of a rational basis for the state's
action was enough to sustain the statute. '
Similarly, state highways, the field of legislation in Barnwell, were
recognized by Southern Pacific as a field where "the state has a far
more extensive control than . . . [it has over] interstate railroads"

which constituted thd field of legislation in both Southern Pacific and
Firemen.4 Given legislation in an area of such vital state interest the
Court in Barnwell was willing to accept a more serious burden on interstate commerce than that in Firemen and still uphold the state law simply
on proof that it had a rational basis.
However, in Southern Pacific-a closer- case-the Court was not
convinced that Arizona had acted in an area of strong state interest ;4
and the Court also foresaw the possibility that the statute created a more
dangerous situation than that which the state action was designed to
correct. 3 Accordingly, the Court assumed the task of deciding between
conflicting evidence. Thus, the decision to make this public policy
determination when a closer question concerning state interference with
interstate commerce was presented suggests the possibility that two
distinct lines of cases exist concerning state power to regulate interstate
commerce.
Carl R. Klein
39. 325 U.S. at 782
40. 393 U.S. at 139.

41
. 325 U.S. at 783.. See also, ,e.g., Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598 (1940).
for a discussion of the great degree of state control over state highways. Barnwell
itself recognizes the extensive state interest in state highways. 303 U.S. at 187.
42. 325 U.S. at 783.
43. 325 U.S. at 781.

